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Abstract
Designing secure protocols over ad-hoc networks has proved to be a very challenging task, due to various
features of such networks, such as partial connectivity, node mobility, and resource constraints. Furthermore,
their lack of physical infrastructures deprives their users of even basic network functions such as message
routing, for which nodes are themselves responsible.
In this paper we consider a very basic network function, node discovery, in ad-hoc networks, where a node
with limited network information would like to establish a session with a given number of other nodes in
the network (of which the node may not be aware about). We formally deﬁne correctness, security and
eﬃciency properties of node discovery protocols, and investigate the problem of designing such protocols
under appropriate network topology assumptions. Here, the security of these protocols is against Byzantine
adversaries that can corrupt up to a limited number of nodes in the network and make them arbitrarily
deviate from their protocol. After presenting some secure node discovery protocols, we show their application
to secure service architectures in ad-hoc networks.
Keywords: Secure node discovery, client-server architectures, threshold cryptography, mobile ad hoc
networks
1 Introduction
Ad-hoc networks are a collection of wireless nodes, communicating among them-
selves without the help of any infrastructure such as base stations or access points.
As the development of wireless services such as cable TV, secure audio conferenc-
ing, visual broadcasts, military command and control grows, so does the number of
civilian, ﬁnancial and military applications of research on ad-hoc networks. As it
is expected from the importance of these applications, security plays a key role for
the success of the development of such wireless services, and the research area of
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security and cryptography over ad-hoc networks is currently growing at a very fast
pace.
As a consequence of the lack of infrastructure in ad-hoc networks, even basic
communication functions such as message routing are a burden on the wireless nodes
themselves. Furthermore, limited resource of wireless devices may signiﬁcantly con-
strain the connectivity among nodes, and messages of any type of communication
session have to necessarily go through multi-hop paths before reaching destination.
In this paper we consider node discovery protocols in ad-hoc networks. In a node
discovery protocol a node with limited network information would like to establish
a session with a given number of other nodes in the network (of which the node
may not be aware about). Here, we model the process of establishing a session by
a simple query-reply interaction, being unique with respect to the identities of the
parties involved. Node discovery over ad-hoc networks should be considered a very
basic network functionality, even more than message routing, or route discovery
(a typical component of message routing). As a result, we expect node discovery
subprotocols to be useful for several protocols over ad-hoc networks, including pro-
tocols for client-server architectures, which we exemplify in this paper. We formally
deﬁne correctness, security and eﬃciency properties of node discovery protocols,
as follows: by correctness, we mean that when all parties are honest, an initiator
node can discover enough nodes in the network; by security (against a Byzantine
adversary corrupting up to τ nodes, for some known parameter τ), we mean that in
the presence of such adversary, the initiator node can still discovery enough nodes
in the network; ﬁnally, the main eﬃciency properties we focus on are the number of
session establishment attempts from the initiator node, and the amount of interac-
tion between the initiator node and the rest of the network. (Both metrics crucially
aﬀect standard eﬃciency metrics in ad-hoc networks, such as latency, bandwidth,
battery life, energy consumption, etc.) We then investigate the problem of design-
ing such protocols under appropriate (and as weak as possible) network topology
assumptions. We present 3 protocols, the most interesting requiring reasonably
weak topology assumptions and presenting satisfactory eﬃciency properties. This
work builds on previous work we did in [5,6], where variants of some protocols pre-
sented there may be rephrased as node discovery protocols secure against static
adversaries under appropriate topology assumptions. In this paper, we surface and
formalize the notion of node discovery, we present new protocols secure against
adaptive adversaries (namely, adversaries corrupting nodes at any time during the
protocol) and we suggest a way to analyze and compare the eﬃciency of such pro-
tocols. We conclude by showing applications of secure node discovery protocols
to secure service architectures in ad-hoc networks, under symmetric or asymmetric
cryptographic primitives.
2 Model and Deﬁnitions
We ﬁrst describe our modeling of a mobile ad-hoc network, including assumptions
on the network topology and on the knowledge of parties. We then deﬁne our notion
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of secure node discovery protocols in mobile ad-hoc networks.
2.1 Network modeling
MANETs put severe constraints on the connectivity among parties and, in gen-
eral, network connectivity among all parties cannot be guaranteed. Because of the
wireless nature of the parties’ devices, it is not guaranteed that all parties are in
the radio range of a given party; in addition, the shape of a radio range of a given
party can diﬀer according to the location, time, device power, and device energy.
Therefore we model the connectivity among the parties with a connectivity graph
G, where each node in G is associated with a diﬀerent party, and an edge between
any two nodes implies that the two associated parties are within radio range of
each other (for simplicity, we only consider the case of bidirectional connectivity).
In addition, graph G can vary in time according to party mobility or unavailabil-
ity, due to factors such as geographical changes, power disruption or low battery.
These events trigger changes in graph G modeled as failure and creation of nodes
and edges; therefore the structure of graph G varies according to such changes (for
notational simplicity we omit a time-dependent subscript in the notations related to
G and we assume without loss of generality that n is an upper bound on the number
of parties). We also make the simplifying assumption of absence of contention or
transmission errors, as these can be dealt with in a modular fashion and at diﬀerent
layers.
Assumptions on the network topology. In the rest of the paper we will use the
following assumptions on the topology of graph G = (V,E) during the entire life
of the protocols executed over the network modeled as G. (Here, ρ, σ, τ1, τ2 are
parameters in {1, . . . , n}).
(i) ρ-neighbor assumption: at any time, every node in V has at least ρ neighbors
(ii) σ-connectivity assumption: at any time, for any σ nodes N1, . . . , Nσ in V , the
graph G′, obtained by removing N1, . . . , Nσ and all edges incident to them from
G, remains connected.
(iii) (τ1, τ2)-reachability assumption: at any time, for any node N ∈ V and any τ1
nodes N1, . . . , Nτ1 in V \{N}, the graph G
′, obtained by removing N1, . . . , Nτ1
and all edges incident to them from G, contains at least τ2 nodes reachable
from N .
We note that the σ-connectivity assumption implies the ρ-neighbor assumption, for
ρ = σ+1, and any σ ∈ {0, . . . , n−1} (or otherwise there exists a node with at most
ρ − 1 = σ neighbors, and removing such neighbors will disconnect the graph). We
also note that the (τ1, τ2)-reachability assumption, when τ2 ≥ n−1− τ1, is identical
to the the σ-connectivity assumption, for σ ≤ τ1.
Assumptions on the knowledge of parties. We will assume that each party can be
associated with a unique address; say, a 64-bit IPv6 address, which we will, from
now on, simply refer to as ID. We will then assume that each party is aware of the
her neighbor nodes’ ID, but is not required to have additional knowledge about the
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ID of other parties or about the remaining topology of graph G (other than the
direct neighbors).
2.2 Secure node discovery in MANETs
Deﬁning node discovery. Informally speaking, in a node discovery protocol a
single user at a network node would like to learn about the existence and network
reachability of a number of other network nodes. As node discovery can be used
in diﬀerent applications, we will not focus on modes of operation with respect to a
speciﬁc application, but abstract its mode of operation as a generic ‘session estab-
lishment’. Speciﬁcally, in any such protocol, the goal of a node N will be that of
establishing a reliable session with one or more other nodes N1, . . . , Nu in the graph.
For simplicity, we assume that a single query-reply interaction, where node N sends
the query and any node, say, Ni, among nodes N1, . . . , Nu sends the answer, is
suﬃcient to establish a reliable session between nodes N and Ni.
Let 1k be a security parameter in unary and let G be the connectivity graph
of a mobile ad-hoc network. Formally, we deﬁne node discovery protocols as a
pair of subprotocols: a preprocessing subprotocol, where preliminary information
is exchanged among the parties in the network, and a discovery subprotocol, where
the preliminary information is used to guarantee successful discovery of any desired
number of nodes from any given node. Then an execution of a node discovery proto-
col is denoted as NDP≡ (Πpre,Πdis), and consists of one execution of a preprocessing
protocol Πpre and polynomially (in k) many executions of a discovery protocol Πdis.
Both protocols Πpre and Πdis are run among all parties in the network; protocol
Πdis is started by a node, which we will refer to as the initiator. For any positive
integer t, we require that a t-node discovery protocol NDP≡ (Πpre,Πdis) in a mobile
ad-hoc network G satisﬁes the following requirement:
• Correctness: If parties P1, . . . , Pn honestly run all executions of protocols Πpre
and Πdis, then with probability 1 at the end of each execution of protocol Πdis,
the party acting as initiator, on input 1t, returns in that execution t distinct
identities ID1, . . . , IDt.
If all nodes honestly follow their protocol, then a trivial node discovery protocol is
achieved by a distributed implementation of the following reachability algorithm:
in the preprocessing protocol, all nodes discover their neighbors; in the discovery
protocol, the initiator Pj discovers its neighbors, and asks them to recursively dis-
cover previously undiscovered nodes and forward their identity to Pj , until Pj has
discovered at least t distinct nodes (that is, until Pj has received at least t distinct
ID’s). The problem of node discovery becomes non-trivial in the presence of adver-
saries that can corrupt some of the parties involved in the execution of protocols
Πpre and Πdis.
Deﬁning security of node discovery. We ﬁrst characterize the power of a
(Byzantine) adversary whenever a node discovery protocol is run over a mobile ad-
hoc network. A ﬁrst, basic, attacking strategy for a Byzantine adversary is that
of corrupting nodes that participate to session establishment; in particular, if an
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initiator is trying to establish a session with a corrupted node, we will assume that
the initiator may not be successful in discovering the corrupted node. In addition
to corrupting parties that are supposed to be discovered, an adversary can corrupt
parties that are responsible for routing ID’s to initiators. Even more, an adversary
can physically move parties in the neighborhood of an initiator before the protocol
starts, so that the client must rely on a smaller number of neighbors for routing
purposes, or even replicate each corrupted party into additional parties with the
same ID (although, as we will see this latter kind of adversarial strategies is easily
dealt with). More formally, we consider a Byzantine adversary that can corrupt
up to τ parties at any diﬀerent times during the execution of the protocol NDP,
and can arbitrarily modify their programs for the rest of the protocol, including
stopping message routing, moving them and replicating them.
We now study schemes allowing any initiator in a mobile ad-hoc network to
discover any given number of nodes, even in the presence of Byzantine adversaries
that corrupt up to τ network nodes diﬀerent from the initiator (or otherwise the
node discovery problem trivializes).
Recall that we denote an execution of a node discovery protocol as NDP≡
(Πpre,Πdis), consisting of one execution of a preprocessing protocol Πpre and poly-
nomially (in k) many executions of a discovery protocol Πdis. For any positive
integer t, we require that a τ -secure t-node discovery protocol NDP≡ (Πpre,Πdis) in
a mobile ad-hoc network G satisﬁes the following requirement:
• Security. Let Pj ∈ V (G), for j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, be an initiator in an execution of Πdis,
and let A be a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm, called the (Byzantine)
adversary, that at any time during the protocol can choose up to ≤ τ indices
i1, . . . , iτ ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {j} and play as Pi1 , . . . , Piτ until the rest of the protocol,
arbitrarily modifying their program (including physically moving them), or even
replicating them. We say that an execution of protocol NDP is successful if at
the end of the execution of protocol Πdis, party Pj , on input 1
t, returns t distinct
identities of parties in V (G) \ {Pj} that received a session establishment request
from Pj , and such that with at least t − τ of them the session establishment
protocol was successfull. Then, for any adversary A, the probability that an
execution of protocol NDP is not successful, is negligible.
Some immediate observations include: (1) it is trivially impossible to obtain a τ -
secure t-node discovery scheme for any t > n − 1 − τ (in the rest of the paper,
for simplicity, we focus on the most interesting case t = 2τ + 1 ≤ n); (2) when
t ≤ n − 1 − τ , the problem of designing a τ -secure t-node discovery protocol has
a trivial solution on wired networks where any two nodes are connected and the
adversary cannot manipulate the routing among any two nodes, as a node can just
contact a new neighbor to discover a new node. The problem becomes non-trivial
for ad-hoc networks because of their partial topology. In fact, it is simple to exhibit
graph topologies for which even an adversary corrupting a single node can prevent
the design of a secure 1-node discovery scheme.
Topology assumptions. The possibility and performance of protocols over ad-hoc
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networks crucially depends on the topology assumptions on the network graph.
Proving properties of a protocol under stronger topology assumptions makes such
property less likely to hold in real-life ad-hoc networks, even more so in the presence
of node mobility. We are therefore especially interested in minimizing the topology
assumptions under which node discovery protocols are proved correct and secure.
Eﬃciency measures. We will also be particularly interested in the following two
eﬃciency measures: the number of initiator requests, deﬁned as the number of
session establishment attempts made by the initiator N on input 1t; the number
of initiator rounds, deﬁned as the number of communication rounds between the
initiator N and nodes in the rest of the network. Standard eﬃciency metrics for
protocols over ad-hoc networks, such as latency, bandwidth, battery power, energy
consumption, etc., are all directly aﬀected by the two deﬁned eﬃciency measures.
3 Discovering Nodes over Ad-Hoc Networks
In this section we present node discovery protocols over ad-hoc networks, that re-
main secure in the presence of a Byzantine adversary that can corrupt at any time
during the exection of the protocol up to a limited number τ of network nodes.
We present 3 protocols under appropriate topology assumptions, the main design
goals being (1) minimizing the topology assumption, and (2) minimizing eﬃciency
metrics, both being deﬁned in Section 2. Our most interesting protocol is a τ -secure
t-node discovery protocol, for t = 2τ + 1, which, under the (τ, 2τ + 1)-reachability
assumption, only requires O() initiator rounds and O(τ · ) initiator requests, for
 = log τ .
Common setup in all protocols. We assume that access to the ad-hoc network is
granted by an oﬀ-line trusted authority, who also acts as a certiﬁcation authority
which gives to each user (who has not registered yet) a certiﬁcate that matches
the user’s ID and signature veriﬁcation key. We note that this assumption is quite
realistic in military ad-hoc networks (the main setting motivating this work). During
a node discovery protocol, each party will sign her messages using the signature
veriﬁcation key certiﬁed by the trusted authority, and attach to them the certiﬁcate
obtained when joining the network. Some properties implied by the above setting,
which we will use in the proof of all protocols, are as follows. First, since the users’
IDs are bound to their signature veriﬁcation keys by the authority’s certiﬁcates,
there is no gain in an adversary to replicate a corrupted node, since all replicas will
at most establish multiple sessions with the same ID, and therefore won’t alter the
total number of nodes discovered by an initiator node (thus, all our protocols are
secure against “identity-replication attacks”). Secondly, attempts from an adversary
to register with diﬀerent IDs are fruitless, as the trusted authority is required to
check the veridicity of IDs, and will therefore not issue two certiﬁcates to the same
party claiming to have diﬀerent ID’s (thus, all our protocols are secure against
“Sybil attacks”). Finally, we note that since all session establishment messages are
signed and authenticated, any changes to their content or to the original sender’s
ID are detected while they are forwarded over multiple hops on the ad-hoc network.
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3.1 A protocol under the (2τ + 1)-neighbor assumption
As a warmup, we consider the following protocol NDP1 = (Πpre,Πdis). Subprotocol
Πpre has no special deﬁnitional requirement, and subprotocol Πdis is deﬁned as
follows. The initiator N , in input 1t, for t = 2τ +1, asks to establish a session with
any t of its neighbors N1, . . . , Nu. At the end of the protocol, N returns the ID’s
of all nodes among N1, . . . , Nu, with which the session establishment protocol was
successful.
The analysis is trivial: by the (2τ +1)-neighbor assumption, the initiator N has
u ≥ 2τ +1 neighbors and the initiator can ask t of them to establish a session; since
the adversary can corrupt at most τ neighbors, the session establishment protocol
is successful with at least t− τ of them.
Thus NDP1 is a τ -secure t-node discovery protocol, for t = 2τ + 1, with O(1)
initiator rounds and O(τ) initiator requests, under the (2τ+1)-neighbor assumption.
3.2 Two protocols under the (τ, 2τ + 1)-reachability assumption
We would like to reduce the topology assumption associated with protocol NDP1,
and consider protocols that work for wider families of network graphs. We note
that the (τ + 1)-neighbor assumption is necessary to obtain secure node discovery
protocols against adversary that corrupt up to τ nodes, or otherwise there exists a
node N such that all its neighbors can be corrupted by the adversary and N , when
acting as an initiator, may not be allowed by the adversary to establish a session
with any other node in the network graph. As a consequence, we now consider
the problem of ﬁnding node discovery protocols under assumptions weaker than the
(2τ +1)-neighbor assumption, but not weaker than the (τ+1)-neighbor assumption.
Speciﬁcally, we will focus on the (τ, 2τ + 1)-reachability assumption. We show two
protocols secure under this assumption: the ﬁrst one with O(1) initiator rounds
and O(τ2) initiator requests, and the second having O(log τ) initiator rounds and
O(τ log τ) initiator requests.
A protocol with satisfactory initiator rounds. We now consider the following
protocol NDP2 = (Πpre,Πdis). It has a satisfactory number of initiator rounds, but
a large number of initiator requests.
Protocol description. Subprotocol Πpre has no special deﬁnitional requirement, and
subprotocol Πdis is deﬁned as follows. We consider an initiator N that takes as
input 1t, for t = 2τ +1, and has u neighbors N1, . . . , Nu, and we set u
′ = min(u, t).
For i = 1, . . . , u′, N asks neighbor Ni to forward N ’s session establishment request
to t distinct nodes that are reachable from Ni (including Ni but not including N),
and to forward to N such nodes’ session establishment replies. At the end of this
process, N returns the ID’s of at least t−τ distinct nodes reachable from any among
N1, . . . , Nu′ , with which the session establishment was successful.
Protocol analysis. The correctness of NDP2 is simply seen to hold; in particular,
we consider simple query-reply interactions to be suﬃcient to establish a session
between any two communicating parties, and then by forwarding query-reply inter-
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actions along the graph, it is possible to have N establish a session with any of the
t nodes that are reachable from N .
For the security, we ﬁrst note that for any τ nodes corrupted at any time by the
adversary among the neighbors N1, . . . , Nu′ of the initiator N , by the (τ, 2τ + 1)-
reachability assumption, there exist 2τ + 1 nodes that are reachable from N (even
if τ corrupted nodes and their adjacent edges are disconnected from the network
graph). Thus, t = 2τ+1 nodes will receive the session establishment request from N .
Since we assume that query-reply interactions cannot be modiﬁed by intermediate
parties, it is possible to have N establish a session with any of the 2τ +1 nodes that
are reachable from N . As a consequence, the protocol returns at least t− τ IDs of
nodes with which N successfully established a session.
We note that with respect to NDP1, protocol NDP2 reduces the topology as-
sumption, but signiﬁcantly increases the number of initiator requests. In the worst
case, NDP2 makes O(τ
2) session establishment attempts, while NDP1 only makes
O(τ) of them.
A protocol with satisfactory initiator rounds and requests. We now consider
the following protocol NDP3 = (Πpre,Πdis). In addition to reducing the topology
assumptions, it has satisfactory performance both in the number of initiator rounds
and in the number of initiator requests.
Protocol description. Subprotocol Πpre has no special deﬁnitional requirement, and
subprotocol Πdis is deﬁned as follows. We consider an initiator N that takes as input
1t, for t = 2τ + 1, and has u neighbors N1, . . . , Nu and we set u
′ = min(u, t). The
protocol is divided into phases; at each phases N obtains a number of identities
of new nodes with which the session establishment protocol was successful (this
number being dependent on the adversary’s behavior); ﬁnally, the last phase is
deﬁned as the phase where the number of all sessions successfully established by N
becomes at least t− τ .
In the ﬁrst phase, for i = 1, . . . , u′, in parallel N asks neighbor Ni to forward
N ’s session establishment request to t1 = 2 distinct nodes that are reachable from
Ni (including Ni but not including N), and to forward to N such nodes’ session
establishment replies. At the end of this process, N partitions the set of neighbors
NS = {N1, . . . , Nu′} into two sets NSy,1 and NSn,1, where NSy,1 contains the set
of neighbors in NS that forwarded to N identities of 2 distinct nodes with which the
session establishment with N was successful, and NSn,1 is deﬁned as NS \NSn,1.
In this ﬁrst phase, N has received |NSy,1| distinct identities.
In the second phases N sets t2 = 2 · (t − t1 · |NSy,1|)/|NSy,1|, and the same
process is repeated with N asking each neighbor Ni in NSy,1 to forward N ’s session
establishment request to t2 distinct nodes that are reachable from Ni (including Ni
but not including N), and to forward to N such nodes’ session establishment replies.
Again, N partitions NSy,1 into two sets NSy,2 and NSn,2, deﬁned analogously to
NSy,1 and NSn,1; speciﬁcally, NSy,2 contains the set of neighbors in NSy,1 that
forwarded to N identities of t2 distinct nodes with which the session establishment
with N was successful, and NSn,2 is deﬁned as NSy,1 \NSn,2.
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Later, in the third phase N continues sending its queries to set NSy,2 of neighbors
and by setting t3 = 2 ·(t−t1 · |NSy,1|−t2 · |NSy,2|)/|NSy,2|. The process continues
for jmax phases, until N has received at least t distinct identities of nodes that
received a session establishment request and at least t − τ distinct identities of
nodes with which the session establishment protocol was successfull. (This implies
that jmax satisﬁes tjmax+1 ≤ 0.)
Protocol analysis. We now analyze the correctness, security and performance prop-
erties of protocol NDP3. First of all, we note that by jmax we have denoted the
number of phases of protocol NDP3. It is immediate to see that jmax is also an
upper bound on the number of initiator rounds, and that jmax · t is an upper bound
on the number of initiator requests. We would like therefore to compute an upper
bound on the value of jmax, for each adversary’s behavior.
Recall that by tj we denote the number of identities that N tries to obtain during
phase j. Also, we denote as Idnumj the number of identities that N still would like
to obtain at the beginning of phase j (i.e., the max between 0 and the value equal
to t minus the number of identities obtained so far). We note that Idnum1 = t,
Idnumjmax = 0 and t1 = t. It is also immediate to see that tj ≥ Idnumj in the
j-th phase, for each j. This guarantees that the correctness properties of NDP3 is
satisﬁed.
We also note that at each phase the adversary can decide to corrupt some new
parties that were uncorrupted in the previous phases. (The only restriction on the
adversary being that the number of corrupted nodes is at most τ .) More precisely,
the adversary can schedule its corrupted nodes over all phases to either prevent N
to successfully establish sessions with t distinct nodes, or to maximize the number
of phases. By the (τ, 2τ + 1)-reachability assumption, there exist t nodes that are
reachable from N , for any such schedule from the adversary. Therefore, protocol
NDP3 eventually will allow such nodes to establish a session with N , regardless of
the adversary’s strategy. This proves the security of NDP3.
In what follows, we complete the analysis of the performance of NDP3 by com-
puting an upper bound on jmax. We say that a neighbor Ni of N is corrupted at
phase j if there exists a phase index j′ ≤ j such that in phase j′ the number of
identities forwarded from node Ni to node N is smaller than tj′. We then denote as
Corrnodj the number of nodes that have been corrupted by the adversary by the
end of phase j, and we deﬁne NotY etCorj as τ − Corrnodj; that is, NotY etCorj
represents the number of nodes that may still be corrupted by the adversary after
the end of phase j. Since we consider simple query-reply interactions to be suﬃcient
to establish a session between any two communicating parties, then by forwarding
query-reply interactions along the graph, it is possible to have N establish a session
with any of the t nodes that are reachable from N . As a consequence, the protocol
returns at least t distinct ID’s of nodes with which N established a session. The
crucial observation we make here is that at the j-th phase either the adversary cor-
rupts at least half of the neighbors of N in set NSy,j, or N is able to successfully
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establish sessions with at least tj/2 new nodes. This implies that when j ≥ 2,
either NotY etCorj ≤ NotY etCorj−1/2 or Idnumj ≤ Idnumj−1/2.
Since the last phase, indexed as jmax, happens when Idnumjmax = 0, by the latter
observation, and by recalling that NotY etCor1 = τ and Idnum1 = t, we obtain
that jmax ≤ log τ + 2.
We note that protocol NDP3 is based on a topology assumption weaker than
protocol NDP1. We then note that with respect to NDP2, protocol NDP3 only
moderately increases the number of initiator rounds (i.e., from O(1) to O(log τ)),
but it signiﬁcantly reduces the number of initiator requests (i.e., from O(τ2) to
O(τ log τ)).
4 Applications: Secure client-server Architectures
One interesting research problem about distributed networks is the design and anal-
ysis of client-server architectures. This problem has been studied in several speciﬁc
variants in diﬀerent research areas, including distributed systems, peer-to-peer net-
works, etc. In this paper, for sake of generality, we consider the following, very
abstract, version of it: in an ad-hoc network, we would like to realize an archi-
tecture, or a set of protocols, that allow users to provide and receive services of
diﬀerent kind; any node in the network may or may not be capable of providing
some or all desired services (out of a given set of them), and we would like any node
in the network to be able, at any time, to request a given service from other par-
ties in the network; this involves ﬁnding the nodes in the network that provide the
given service and obtaining it from them. The process of requesting and providing
services is abstracted as a simple query-reply interaction between any two parties.
There are several security problems in such client-server architectures. In the
case of the strongest (known) attacks, Byzantine attacks, we consider an adversary
that can corrupt (a limited number of) parties and arbitrarily modify their behavior.
In the case of ad-hoc networks, this power is further increased in that the adversary
can even choose to move the corrupted party and consequently modify the network
topology, or duplicate the party’s computing equipment, thus eﬀectively creating
new nodes (with the same ID). In the context of protocols within client-server
architectures, an adversary corrupting a node may disrupt the execution of the
protocol in several ways: it may prevent a service to be routed to the request
initiator from other nodes (say, by refusing to provide correct routing of a message
from the server to the initiator), it may refuse to respond to an initiator’s request,
or it may even respond, but still provide an incorrect service.
In the next two subsections we outline two proposals for secure client-server
architectures, both based on generic secure node discovery protocols. The ﬁrst one
is based on asymmetric cryptography, and is related to an architecture proposed in
[7], which however addressed a more speciﬁc client-server architecture problem (our
architecture uses any generic secure node discovery protocols, and can be used to
improve the architecture for the speciﬁc problem from [7]). The second one is new
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and is uniquely based on symmetric cryptography, thus resulting in a much more
eﬃcient architecture. In both solutions we assume for simplicity that all nodes can
act as a server and provide the service requested by the speciﬁc request initiator; the
extension to the case where only some nodes are capable of providing the requested
service can be easily dealt with and is omitted for lack of space.
A Secure client-server architecture using asymmetric cryptography. This
architecture uses the following tools:
(i) A secure node discovery protocol, such as those from Section 3, where any
initiator node can discover t = 2τ +1 nodes, where τ is an upper bound on the
number of parties ever corrupted by the adversary;
(ii) A veriﬁably-ID-binding signature scheme [6], based on statistically-unique and
cryptographic veriviable identiﬁers [10,9], allowing any node to sign its mes-
sages using a signature that is unforgeably linked to the node’s ID;
(iii) A threshold signature scheme over ad-hoc networks [5,6], allowing any node to
collect 2τ +1 partial signatures of the same message that can be combined into
a single signature, even if τ signatures were generated by an adversary.
The above tools are combined in a secure client-server architecture as follows. The
service request initiator starts a secure node discovery protocols, where it tries to
discover 2τ + 1 servers and forwards to them its service request. The discovered
servers compute the service reply message and sign it twice: ﬁrst, using the partial
signature of the threshold signature scheme, to guarantee that the service reply
cannot be modiﬁed by intermediate nodes routing the answer to the initiator; and
second, using the veriﬁably-ID-binding signature scheme, to guarantee the match-
ing between the service and the server’s ID, which guarantees that an adversary
corrupting up to τ nodes at most corrupts a minority of the nodes providing the
service.
Attractive properties of this architecture include: security against adaptive ad-
versaries (if this type of security is enjoyed by the threshold signatures, as in [6], and
thanks to the fact that the secure node discovery protocols from Section 3 also enjoy
this type of security); no need for a certiﬁcation authority (eﬀectively, a public-key
infrastructure is not needed, thanks to the properties of veriﬁably-ID-binding sig-
nature schemes); weakened topology assumptions (thanks to the analogue property
of the secure node discovery protocols from Section 3); service non-repudiation and
short node’s private key.
A Secure client-server architecture using symmetric cryptography. This
architecture uses the following tools:
(i) A secure node discovery protocol, such as those from Section 3, where any
initiator node can discover t = 2τ +1 nodes, where τ is an upper bound on the
number of parties ever corrupted by the adversary;
(ii) A server-based 2-conference key-distribution scheme [1], allowing an oﬀ-line
authority to distribute private keys to all parties entering the network, so that
any 2 parties can compute a shared private key, only given their identities,
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which looks random to all other parties.
(iii) A message authentication scheme (MAC).
The above tools are combined in a secure client-server architecture as follows. The
service request initiator starts a secure node discovery protocols, where it tries
to discover 2τ + 1 servers and forwards to them its service request. During this
protocol, requests and reply sent between two nodes N1 and N2 are authenticated
using the MAC algorithm and the key shared by N1 and N2, where the responsibility
of exchanging the identities of these two parties (whenever they are not neighbors)
is of any intermediate nodes. The discovered servers compute the service reply
message and authenticate it using the MAC algorithm, where the key used is the
key shared by the request initiator and the speciﬁc server. This serves both as a
way to link the reply to the ID of the server computing it, and as a partial MAC
being a component of a threshold MAC, since the initiator receiving several MACs
can implement a threshold veriﬁcation of them. Furthermore, such messages are
MAC-ed again by the intermediate routing nodes, by using the MAC algorithm
with a key shared by the speciﬁc routing node and the request initiator.
Attractive properties of this architecture include: security against adaptive ad-
versaries (if this type of security is enjoyed by the threshold signatures, as in [6],
and thanks to the fact that the secure node discovery protocols from Section 3 also
enjoy this type of security); weakened topology assumptions (thanks to the analogue
property of the secure node discovery protocols from Section 3); and greater time-
eﬃciency, due to the much higher eﬃciency of symmetric cryptographic primitives.
Disclaimer. The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the author and should
not be interpreted as representing the oﬃcial policies, either expressed or implied, of the Army Research
Laboratory or the U.S. Government.
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